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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS 
AG£NCY-ACCOUNTING FOR PROCEEDS OF Ii.LEGAL CONTRACT Of SALE OF IN-
TOXICATING LIQUORS.-Following the decision of the United States Supreme 
Court that the Wilson Act did not affect interstate shipments of liquor until 
final delivery by the carrier, Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U. S. 4I2, (,898), Congress 
passed the Webb-Kenyon Act, 37 Stat. at L. 699 (I9I3). .Meantime, in I9I3, 
35 Stat. at L. n36, Sec. 239, it was enacted that it should be a penal offense 
for any .-:ari'ier or other agent, in connection with the interstate carriage of 
intoxicating liquors, to collect the purchase price from the consignee, or in 
any manner act as agent of buyer or seller, except in the actual transporta· 
tion or delivery thereof. After this act carriers and banks r..:fused to act as 
collection agents in such sales, and dealers resorted to the plan of consigning 
liquor which had been ordered from prohibition states, to their own order, 
mailing the bill of lading to an agent, with instructions to deliver the same 
upon payment of the accompanying draft by the purchaser. In Da11ciger v. 
Cooley, U. S. Supreme Court, Adv. 0. I39, Jan. 7, I9I9, it was held that this 
was ih violation of Sec. 239, supra, and of course illegal. The shipment was 
made before I9I3, and so did not involve the Webb-Kenyon Act. 
The Kansas Supreme Court, g8 Kan. 38, 484, from which this case was an 
appeal, had decided that the transaction was an illegal sale, and therefore the 
principal could not collect from the agent the proceeds of the violation of the 
law. On this point the Federal Court held the right of a principal to recover 
such money from an agent was a question of local law and could not be re-
examined by the court. 
It is a general rule that an agent cannot dispute his principal's title, and 
this is so even when the agent seeks to set up the illegality of the transaction. 
He cannot for that reason steal the money and set his principal at defiance. 
Baldwin Bros. v. Potter, 46. Vt. 402. But the courts are not in agreement on 
this matter, especially where the principal is engaged in a business that is 
against the public policy of the State. Mexican Int. Banking Co. v. Lichten-
stein, IO Utah 338 (a lottery business). The Kansas court agrees with this 
view and does not limit it to cases involving public policy. Alexander v. 
Barker, 64 Kan. 3g6 .. 
BILLS AND NoT£S-C£RTIFICAT£S OF D£POSIT.-A certificate of deposit was 
purchased by a bank n0 months after its date. It was issued "subject to the 
rules of the Savings Department," as it showed on its face. It bore interest 
if left 6 months, but interest was to cease one year from date. Held, the 
certificate was negotiable and was taken by the bank in due course, since 
(1) subjecting it to the rules of the Savings department did not make it pay-
able out of a particular fund nor deprive it of the requisite certainty, (2) 
although it was in effect a promissory note payable on demand, the reasonable 
time within which it was required to be presented was indicated by the time 
at which interest ceased, namely, 12 months from date. White v. Wadhams, 
(Mich. 1918) 170 N. W. 6o. 
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The first point here .decided, as to the effect of subjecting the certificate 
of deposit to the rules of the savings department, is one .which does not seem 
to have been heretofore passed upon by any court of the last resort. But the 
decision is in harmony with the common financial practice. The second 
point, that the termination of the running of interest fixes the time within 
which it must be negotiated, is in accord with the general rule stated in the 
books that interest bearing notes do not call for such prompt presentation as 
demand paper which bears no interest. Daniel on Neg. Inst. (6th ed.) § 6rn; 
Byles on Bills *2I3; Randolph on Commercial Paper, § I097. The case of 
Kirkwood v. First National Bank, 40 Neb. 484, involved exactly the same 
question upon a similar certificate of deposit, and the decision was the same. 
CARRIER'S LIABILITY oN BILLS OF LADING FOR WHICH No Goons WERE DE-
LIVERED-WHAT LAW GoVERNs.-The law's delays are not entirely of the past. 
On Jan. 7th, I9I9, the United States Supreme Court pronounced what may be 
the final judgment on an action arising in June, I9QO, M. K. & T. Ry. Co. v. 
Sealy, Adv. 0. I23. Defendant at first insisted that a Missouri shipment was 
governed by Missouri and not Kansas law, the action having been brought 
in Kansas. It was not until I9I3 that the defendant company cla,imed that the 
transaction was governed by Federal law. This was doubtless due to the 
fact that it was in that year tfiat the case of Adams E:rpress Co. v. Croninger, 
226 U. s: 49I, decided that by the Carmack Amendment Congress had shown 
its intent to take over the whole subject of limitation of liability by carriers 
of goods in interstate shipments, and that therefore all state laws as to such 
shipments were entirely superseded. The court held that the claim in this 
case could not be maintained, because the Federal question was not seasonably 
"raised, and also because the Carmack Amendment does not apply to a ship~ 
ment made six years before its passage. The Kansas court having three 
times decided adversely to defendant, 78 Kan. 758, 84 Kansas 479, g8 Kan. 225, 
the writ of error was dismissed. 
As to the liability of the common carrier on fraudulent bills of lading, 
issued without receipt of any goods, see I6 MICH·. LAW REv. 402, 4n. The 
passage by Congress of the so-called Uniform Bill of Lading Act, the 
Pomerene Act of August 29, I9I6, 39· Stat. at L. 538, has changed the com-
mon law rule, rigidly adhered to by about half the States and by the U. S. 
Supreme Court, Shaw v. Ry., IOI U. S. 557, Friedlander v. Ry., I30 U. S. 
4I6, in favor of the negotiability rule of Bank of Batavia v. R. R. Co., Io6 
N. Y. I95, which made the carrier liable on a bill of lading to a bona fide 
"holder for value, notwithstanding no goods were receiv.ed. As nearly half 
the States have placed on their statute books this bill of lading act, the pre-
vailing rule in fhe United States now accords with the New York rule, and 
the decision of the Kansas court in the instant case. Plaintiff was allowed 
·to recover of the carrier his advances on the bills of lading to the extent 
they had not been repaid, notwithstanding the bills covered 27 carloads of 
grain, not one bushel of which was ever shipped. 
CARRIER~S LIABILITY-WRITTEN NOTICE OF CLAIM FOR DAMAGES.-That it 
is lawful for a common carrier of goods to stipulate for complete freedom · 
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from liability, unless cl~im for damage is reported within a reasonable time 
after the consignee has notice of the arrival of the goods, has been many 
times held, from So. Exp. Co. v. Caldwell, 21 Wall. 264, to St. Louis, I. M. 
6 S. R. Co. v. Starbird, 243 U: S. 592. If liability is to be claimed, it is only 
fair that the carrier should know of the claim while it is still possible to in-
vestigate the alleged damage. And it is now held that it is not unreasonable 
to require a written record of the claim. The case of So. Pac. Co. v. Stewart, 
U. S. Sup. Ct., Jan. 13, 1919, Adv. 0. l/'6, is one of the belated cases arising 
under the Carmack Amendment of xgo6, and before the Cummins Amend-
ment of March 4 1915. By this amendment interstate shipments after that 
date will be subject to the ninety day limit there provided for. 
The bill of lading in question covered a shipment of cattle, and required 
claim for loss or damage to be made in writing within ten days after unload-
ing the livestock. The Cummins Amendment makes unlawful any rule, con-
tract or regulation for a shortt.r period for giving notice of claims than nir.ety 
days, and for the filing of claims than four,months. But this shipment was 
under the Carmack Amendment, and plaintiff admitted that he had made no 
written claim within ten days. He denied that it was possible for him to 
determine the damage in that time, and claimed waiver of ntltice by the car-
rier in attempting to adjust the claim. The court below charged that if the 
defendant knew of the death of the cattle in transit as alleged in the com-
plaint, then plaintiff was relieved from giving such notice as was required by 
the contract. It has often been held thaLthere is no possible benefit to the 
carrier in receiving written notice of what it already knows, Cockrill v. M. 
K. & T. Ry. Co., 90 Kan. 650, and this rule was approved in the instant case, 
both in the District Court and in the Circuit Court of Appeals, 233 Fed. 956. 
The Supreme Court, however, holds that the requirement that such notice 
be put in permanent form in writing is not unreasonable, and failure to do so 
defeats plaintiff's recovery. 
The rule requires written notice that c;:laims will be made, but allows to 
plaintiff the necessary time to determine what the loss will be before he files 
his bill for damages. By this rule the carrier escaped a liability for losses 
which seem to have been caused by outrageous and willful conduct in hand-
ling the cattle, but the ultimate advantage to the carrier may be doubted. It is 
such experiences as this on the part of the public that have caused much un-
fair legislation against the carrier, such for example as the ninety days ~e­
quired by the Cummins Amendment. After the expiration of three months 
with no notice of any claim it may be very difficult for the carrier to get the 
facts, and juries have a way of believing the evidence submitted by the ship-
per. Jurymen themselves have often had experiences with such claims. 
It is doubtful whether such decisions as that in Wells Fargo Exp. Co. v. 
Townsend, Arkansas, June, 1918, 204 S. W. 417, can stand under the rule as 
above laid down. In that case the court found that a letter from the claim-
agent suggesting that th·e shipper order a duplicate of the lost casting and 
furnish claim covering the value of the original was a waiver of the stipula-
tion for written notice. 
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C.o\RRIERS OF p ASS£NGERS-LU.UTATION OF LIABILITY-CARMACK A:.l£ND-
K£NT.-lt has often been held that a railroad company is not a common car-
rier, when it enters into a special contt'il.ct to transport a circus train, and 
therefore a contract that the railroad company should not be responsible for 
damages arising from want of care in running the cars, or otherwise, is valid. 
Coup v. Wabash Ry. c(}., 56 Mich. III. It has also been held that in dealing 
with human life the law will protect it equally whether the carriage is free, 
or for compensation. P. & R. R. C(}. v. Derby, 14 How • .¢8. Many cases 
have supposed that contracts limiting such liability were invalid, even in the 
case of free passengers, Williams v. Oregon S. L. R. Co., I8 Utah 210, but 
the weight of recent authority is the- other way. Northern Pacific Ry. Co. v. 
Adams, 192 U. S. 440, reversing II6 Fed. 324- And such contracts have been 
upheld in the case of express messengers, news agents and sleeping car port-
ers .. B. & O. Ry. C(}. v. Voigt, 176 U. S. 498. This is based on the principle 
that if a carrier is under no duty to carry, and may elect to refuse, then if 
he does carry he may do it on such terms as he may consent to, and refuse 
to carry unless he is released from assuming any liability for damages. 
Nebraska is one ·of the states th'!-t refuses to permit this limitation, and in 
Mancher v. C. R. I. and P. R. Co., 100 Neb. 237, held that notwithstanding 
contracts signed by a circus employee releasing and exempting the employer 
and the carrier from all c;aims for injuries however sustained, the carrier 
was liable to such employee for injuries caused by the negligence of the eng-
ineer of a train following the circus train. The Nebraska court did not hold 
that plaintiff, riding under this contract, was a passenger, but he was, at least, 
a licensee. The contract affecting human life would be strictly construed, and 
did not excuse the carrier from liability to one lawfully on the right of way 
and injured by its negligence. The defendant sought to carry this to the 
Federal court under the Carmack Amendment. But the United States 
Supreme court, Jan. 7, 1919,.dismissed the. writ of error on, the gr6und that 
the Carmack Amendment deals only with the. shipment of property. As to 
limitation of liability in the carriage of passengers the States are still "free 
to establish tht:ir own laws and policies and apply them to such contracts," in 
accord with the· rule of Pa. R. Co. v. Hughes, 191 U. S. 477. 
Hm:e-PURCHASE AGRttH£NT~NVJ!RSION-M£ASUR£ OF DAHAGr:s.-One 
Miss Nolan held a piano from p!aintiffs under a hire-purchase agreement, 
with option to purchase on payment of the last installment; title to remain· 
in the vendor until such payment had been made. After several ·installments 
had been paid, Miss Nolan sold the piano to the defendant, making " a false 
statutory declaration that the piano was her property." She subsequently 
disappeared. Plaintiff sued in detinue and alternatively for conversion. The · 
defendant paid into court the sum of 181, the amount still due on the piano. 
Held, plaintiffs entitled to judgment .or the return of the piano or the sum 
of 281, its value. Whiteley, Limited v. Hilt, (1918), 2 K. B. us. 
By a perfectly logical course ·of reasoning the court arrives at a correct 
legal c;onclusion supported by the overwhelming weight of authority but hardly 
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in accord with that sense of justice and fair dealing which we ordinarily at-
tribute to "the man in the street." The court says that if :Miss Nolan had any 
interest in the piano it must be by virtue of the agreement alone, and inas-
much as she had repudiated the agreement by the fraudulent sale, she had at the 
date of the sale no interest in the piano which she could transfer to the defend-
ant. This case is differentiated from Bclsi:;e Motor Supply Co. v. Cox, 
(I9i4), I K. B. 244 and Donald v. Suckling, (I866),.L. R. l Q. B. 585, as in 
these cases the act of the conditional vendee was an injustifiable repledge of the 
chattel while in the instant case the act was a conversion and fraudulent sale. 
The result of the decision is, however, that the plaintiff receh·es about one-third 
more than the. value of his chattel and this at the expense of an innocent vendee 
of the wrong doer, with the sorry consolation for the defendant that she has 
a right of action against the absconder. If the verdict of the lower court had 
been sustained, namely, that "the measure of damages was * * * the amount 
of the hire-purchase money remaining unpaid" the plaintiff would ha\•e re-
ceived full compensation for what· he had lost and the innocent defendant 
would not have been punished for the fraudulent act of her vendor. This 
conclusion is justified by the argument of the Ohio court in an analogous 
case: "The wrong doer * * * [is] estopped from setting up any claim by 
virtue of the wrong that he has done." 'Against the innocent purchaser from 
the [wrong doer] the original owner still has "title" to his [property].' 
But by virtue of what does he now have "title" to the [wrong doer's interest in 
the property].' "The estopped, so to call it, .being created by fraud of 
wrong, exists only against the one guilty of that fraud or wrong, which the 
purchaser is not." Railway Co. v. Hutchins, (I877), 32 Oh. St. 584 Never-
theless the weight of authority is against the Ohio court (Cf. Bowles Wooden 
Ware Co. v. United States, (I882), Io6 W. S: 4j2), and possibly the analogy 
between the cases may be called in question, so our instant case is still law 
whatever may be said. as to its justice. 
HUSBAND AND WIF£-CONV£YA?:fC£ TO THEM CREATING "!'£NANCY IN CoM-
MON.-By devise land came to "J. W. and to her husband, A. W., and to their 
heirs and assigns, as tenants in common, to have share and share alike." 
After death of J. W., her husband having predeceased her, her heirs instituted 
suit for partition, and a child of A. W. by a former marrrage intervened 
claiming that as to one-half of the land the heirs of A. \V. were entitled. 
Held, the devisees took as tenants in common and not as tenants by entireties. 
God111a11 v. Greer, (Del.. Orphan's Court, 19I8) 105 Atl. 38o. 
The court seemed to find a great deal· of difficulty in arriving at a con-
clusion the soundness of which cannot admit of much question. Even with-
out the Married Women's Acts a conveyance to parties then husband and 
wife did not inevitably create a tenancy by entireties. I Prestoii 011 Estates, 
132; 2 Blackstone Comm. *182 (Sharswood's Note).-If Preston's view 
lacked the support of decisions squarely in point, at least there were none 
opposed ther!!tO. As pointed out in his· book, husband and wife were not so 
much 011e that they could not during the marriage relation own land as 
tenants in common. In this country there were a fe\~ decisions in which, 
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stressing the oneness of husband and wife too much, it was held no words 
in a conveyance to husband and wife could prevent them taking as tenants 
by entireties. Dias v. Glover, I Hoff. Ch. 7I (but see, contra, Hicks v. 
Cochran,4 Edw. Ch. Io7); Stuckey v. Keefe, 26 Pa. St. 397. On the contrary 
there were not lacking judicial declarations in accord with Preston's view. 
McDermott v. FretJch, IS N. J .. Eq. 78; Hoffman v. Stigers, 28 Iowa 302, 310; 
Brown v. Brown, 133 Ind. 476. Since the Married Women's Acts there can-
not be any question left. Even in Pennsylvania it is now held that a con-
veyance to husband· anci wife may create a tenancy in common. Blease v. 
Anderson, 24I Pa. St. I98. 
INTr:RNATION.AI, LAW-DIPLOMATIC PRIVILEG~WAIVER WITH LEAVE OF 
Sovr:RnGN • .:.....Francisco Suarez died intestate in England in 1797 possessed 
of considerable property. Plaintiff and defendant each claimed to be one of 
the next-of-kin and entitled to share in the intestate's personality. In 1900 
defendant obtained letters of administration and appointed plaintiff his at-
torney to collect moneys due to the estate abroad. In I914 plaintiff issued an 
originating summons asking for an account and for the administration of the 
personal estate by the Court. Service of summons was accepted by defend-
ant's solicitors and an appearance entered in due course. The first hearing 
was adj oumed to enable counsel to ascertain whether defendant intended 
to claim privilege as Minister for Bolivia. Counsel informed· the Court 
presently that defendant waived his diplomatic privilege. Later: defendant's .. 
counsel wrote plaintiff's counsel that waiver of privilege had bee; -~utllorized · 
by the President of Bolivia. The order for administration was made. · Plain-
tiff appealed from the order, defendant gave notice of a cross-contention, 
and the· order was varied to give effect to the contentions of both parties. 
The accounts showed large sums due from defendant. Two sums were 
· lodged in Court, one in pursuance to an order and the other ·voluntarily. 
Defendant also submitted to be surcharged with a large suin to be paid in 
instalments. He defaulted on the first instalment, and was personally served 
with an order to attend before the Master for examination as to his means. 
A supplemental order was made that defendant pay the entire amount into 
Court. rhe next day he left the country. Plaintiff took out a summons for 
leave to proceed to execution and to issue a writ of sequestration against the 
property of defendant. The application ~as refused on the ground of de-
fendant's diplomatic privilege. The summons was permitted to stand over, 
however, with liberty to restore in the event of defendant ceasing to hold 
diplomatic office. Four months later the British Foreign Office informed 
plaintiff's counsel that defendant's appointment as Minis_ter had been term-
inated. Plaintiff restored his summons, his application · was granted, and 
defendant appealed. It was argued for defendant that the Diplomatic Privi-
leges Act of I7o8 made writ and process utterly null and void, and that a 
waiver of privilege, even with the sovereign's consent, could not confer a 
jurisdiction which did not exist. Held, that the order for the issue of .the 
writ of sequestration was properly made. In re Suarez (1907), 87 L. J. 
Ch. 173. 
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Diplomats enjoy immunity from suit, even in cases where neither person 
nor property are immediately affected. J.fagdale11a Steam /\"a;:igatio11 Co. \". 
Martin (1859), 28 L. J. Q. B. 310. The immunity continues for a reasonable 
time after termination of the appointment to enable the diplomat to hand 
over the office to his successor and return to his country. J.!11s11rus Bes v. 
Gadban (1894), 63 L. J. Q. B. 621. The report of !he Foreign Office as to 
the status of foreign dignitaries and their representath-es is conclusi\·e. 
Mighell v. Sultan of Johore (1893), 63 L. ]. Q'. B. 593 (status of foreign 
sovereign); Foster v. Globe Venture S)•11dicate (1900), 69 L. ]. Ch. 375 
(status and boundaries of foreign state). Lord Talbot's dictum that diplo-
matic immunity cannot be waived applies only to wah-er without leave of 
the Sovereign. Sec Barbuit's Case (1737), Cas. t. Tall>. 281. The Diplomatic 
Privileges Act of 17o8 is merely declaratory of the common law, of which 
the law of nations is to be deemed a part. Triquet v. Bath (1764), 3 Burr. 
Diplomatic privilege under the law of nations may be waived with the per-
mission of the diplomat's Government. The opinion suggests that the 
diplomat is the proper source of information with regard to this permission. 
INTERNATIONAL LAw-REQUISITION BY FonEIGN SovEREIGN-IMM-t;:SITY 
FROM PROCESS.-The "Roseric," a privately owned ship, collided with a barge 
belonging to the libellants who subsequently attempted to enforce a lien 
through process and seizure. The ·ship was released on bond. It appeared 
from the statement of amici curiae (counsel for the British Embassy) that 
at the time of the collision the ship was requisitioned as a British transport 
and that the arrest would "interfere with the government business upon 
which.said vessel is engaged." Held, that by rule of comity the vessel was 
exempt during its requisition. To permit the arrest would be inconsistent 
with the dignity and independence of sovereignty which must not be "hamp-
ered or interfered with in tbe use of such instrumentalities." . The "Roseric,"' 
254 Fed. 854 (Dist. Ct. D., New Jersey, 1918). 
The court refused to be led by tl1e per curiam opinion in The "Att11a/ita," 
238 Fed. 909, which did not recognize immunity for a ship in the employment 
of the Italian government, on the ground that the Italian government would 
not be liable for the wrong done by the vessel. That court failed to realize 
the haz;ird of preferring a local claim for damages over the public purpose 
of a foreign sovereign. As a rule the municipal courts are extremely care-
ful to uphold the foreign sovereign in the protection of its public purposes 
as against the local demands for private redress. In The "Parlc111c11t Beige,"' 
Ct. of Appeals, L. R. 5 Prob. Div. 197, the proceeding was in rem against a 
public mail-packet of the Belgian government. It was argued by the claim-
ants that a proceeding in rem was against the vessel only and not against 
the sovereign. The court, however, realized that the property must be con-
sidered as property belonging to someone. The municipal principle as to 
proceedings in rem had to give way when the owner was a foreign sovereign. 
It could not be supposed that the sovereign was not indirectly impleaded. 
To attempt to exercise such authority would be "inconsistent with the in-
dependence and equality of the· state which is represented by such .owne.r." 
MIClllGAN LAW REVIEW 
The court went even farther and said that the declaration of the sovereign 
that the vessel was public "cannot be inquired into." In The "Davis," IO Wall. 
(U. S.), 15, an action in rem was allowed against a shipment of cotton, the 
property of the United States, on board a private vessel, since the property 
was not in the possession· of the United States and process would not 
have to be issued against it. c. H. Weston in an article in 32 HARV. LAW 
Riw., called "Actions Against the Property of Sovereigns" (Jan. 1919), at 
p. :266, assails the "possession" test and suggests the test of public purpose. 
He brings an analogy from the law of municipal corporations whose property 
is not exempt wh~ owned for profit but is exempt when charged with a 
public purpose, viz., hospitals, fire engines, etc. No issue can be taken with 
the proposition that the property of the sovereign which is charged with a 
public purpose should be exempt from local process. But if he means to 
make the local courts the judges of the publjc purposes of sovereigns there 
can be no appfoval. The inevitable and. accepted view is presented in 
Weston's paraphrase of the holdings of the courts on this question: "Sov-
ereign authority would shrink to limall proportions if not permitted to de-
termine what uses of its property are public. To inquire into the use ot 
"Property declared by a foreign sovereign to be public would be to flout the 
dignity of sovereignty which the courts have declared entitled· to respect." It 
may be added that it would not only flout the dignity of sovereignty hut 
would also "endanger the performance of the public duties of the sovereign." 
Briggs v. Lightboats, 93 Mass. (II Allen) 157· The court in the principal 
case, however, attempts to include the ease within the rule of The "Davis," 
supra, by saying that the offii;ers and crew became for the time being "the 
sovereign's instrumentalities and whatever possession of the ship they ob-
tained by reason of this employment was the sovereign's possession while 
the requisition was in force." This reasoning is hardly necessary if the 
sovereign once declares the ship bound on a public purpose. ·But the decision 
is correct and the general principles governing it are unquestionably sound . 
. See· also V avasseur v. Krupp, 9 Ch. D. 351; The "Exchange," II U. S. (7 
Cranch) u6; The "Broadmayne,'' L. R. [1916] Prob. Div. 64 
NEGLIGSNct-SuscoNTRACTOR's DuTY TO MAINTAIN SAFE CoNDITIONS-
INJURitS TO THIRD PasoNs.-Defendant h;td a contract with a building cor-
poration to install the ornamental iron work in a certain building. This in-
cluded the installation of the steel ·work of the inside stairways exclusive. <Jf 
the marble treads whicq were necessary to make the stairway complete. The 
proof showed that it was the universal custom as the construction pro-
gressed to use these staircases with the iron tread for workmen going up and 
'down the building; and that the defendant had full knowledge of such 
actual use in this building. An employee of another contractor doing' 
masonry work upon the building stepped upon a tread of one of these stairs, 
which' fell by reason of the fact that it had not been properly bolted as it 
should have been. The action is for resulting injuries due to the alleged 
negligence of the defendant.. H efd, that the plaintiff could not recover be-
cause the defendant owed him no duty to make the stairway safe. "The 
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obligation did not rest upon the defendant to produce a stairway safe for 
tra\·el, but merely that portion of a stairway which, wheJI compelted by the 
work of someone else, would be a safe means of travel." Smith and Clarke, 
J. J., (dissenting) held that the defenqant owed a duty to those who to his 
knowledge would make use of the stairway. Brady\". Clare111011t Iron 1Vorks 
(Supreme Ct. of New York, App. Div., Jan. 1919), 174 N. Y. Supp. 64 
In Heaven v. Pender, Ct. of Appeal, II Q. B. D. 503, an opposite conclu-
sion ·was reached under facts materially similar to those in the principal case. 
The defendant, a dock owner, under a contract with a ship owner, supplied a 
stage to be slung outside the ship for the purpose of painting. The con-
tractee"s employee was allowed a recovery against the dock ownu for in-
juries caused by the breaking. of a defective rope. The defend:int had no 
actual knowledge that the platform would be used by the plaintiff but the 
court concluded that he •·must have known" if the matter had been con-
sidered at all. The court refused to limit the defendant's duty to the parties to 
the contract. The court said: ·•If a person contracts with another to use ordi-
nary care or skill toward him or his property the obligation need not be con-
sidered in the light of a duty; it is an obligation of contracf. It is undoubted, 
howe,·er, that there may be the obligation of such a duty from one person to 
another although there is no contract between them with regard to such 
duty * * * the existence of a contract between two persons does not.' 
prevent the existence of the suggested duty between. them also being raised 
by !aw. independently of the contract, by facts in regard to which the contract 
is made and to which it applies an exactly similar but ·not a contract duty." 
In a word, the existence of a contract duty does not preclude the existence 
of a duty ex delicto contemporaneous with it and covering the same or a 
broader field. The ntle laid down by the court is, indeed, a reasonable one: 
''Whenever one person is by circumstances placed in such a position with 
regard to another that everyone of ordinary sense who did think would at 
once recoF"nize that if he did not use ordinary care and skill in his own 
conduct with regard to those circumstances he would cause danger.or injury 
to the person or property of the other, a duty arises to use ordinary care and 
skill to avoid such danger." The same rule is expressed in Sweeny v. Old 
Colony Ry., IO Allen· (Mass.) 368, 377. In the principal case the duty to the 
plaintiff seems clear. The knowledge of the future use imposed upon the 
defendant a duty to construct an uncompleted stairway as safe as an un-
completed stairway of that type should be-especially sinee no greater burden 
was imposed than that which the contract with the building corporation im-
posed, namely that due care be exercised in the construction of the stairway. 
The case would have been easily covered by the principle laid down in Mc-
Plzerso1i v. Buick ]fofOI' Co., 217 N. Y. 382, decided in the Court of Appeals 
in the same jurisdiction. See also Huset v. Case Threshing Maclzi11c Co., 
I.20 Fed. 865; Schubert v. Clark, 49 Minn. 331, and the cases discussed in the 
opinions 'of the .principal case. 
NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-LIABILITY OF DRAWJ;R OF BLANK CHECK.-
Plaintiff signed a check made out by his confidential clerk. At the time, it 
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purported to be made Ot!t in figures for 2£, although nothing was writter. 
upon it in words. The figure 2 was so placed, however, that a figure l could 
~e placed before it and a o after it. The clerk thus raised the figures to 
120£, filled in words for that amount, cashed the check and absconded. 
Plaintiff sued for a declaration that the bank on which the check was drawn 
had no right to debit plaintiff's account by more than the 2£ for which the 
check was drawn when signed. Held, the bank was entitled to debit the 
full 120£. London Joint Steck Bank v. Macmillan and Arthur, H. of L., 
[1918] 1918 Ann. Cas. 777. 
The court recognized two issues, namely, whether the plaintiff was guilty -
of negligence in signing the check as '1e did, and whether such negligence 
was a breach of duty between himself and the bank. Both issues were 
decided in the affirmative. The ultimate decision was based also on the 
principle that plaintiff was estopped to deny the authority of his ag~nt to 
fill in as "he did what was practically a blank check when signed. In Com-
mercial Bank v. Arden, 177 Ky. 520 is was held that inasmuch as the Ne-
gotiable Instrument statute of Kentucky made void instruments which had 
been altered without the maker's consent, the maker owed no duty to the 
bank to use care in drawing instruments so that they could not be altered-
an apparent non-sequitur. Most of the American authorities, however, are 
in harmony with the principal decision and impose upon the drawer of a 
check a duty to use due care in protecting the drawee. Otis Elevator Co. v. 
First National Bank, 163 Cal. 31; Timbel v. Garfield National Bank, 100 N. Y. 
S. 497. The. principal case, in its recital of the various interpretations of 
Young v. Grote, 4 Bing. 253, is an interesting commentary on the mechanics 
of the law. 
N UISANCl';-FEAR-TUBttcutos1s HoSPITAr.-REsTRICTIVr: CoVl';N ANTS.-
Lands were leased with covenant by the lessee not to "exercise or carry on, 
or permit to be used, exercised, or carried on, upon the demised premises 
any noisy, noisome, or offensive trade or business, or use any part of the 
premises as a tavern or inn, or at any time during the term do or suffer to 
lie done anything which might be hazardous or noisome or injurious or 
offensive to the" lessor of his property, or to any of bis tenants or under-
tenants." The lessee turned over the demised premises to be used as a 
hospital for children suffering from surgical tuberculosis. On application by 
plaintiffs as neighboring owners and entitled to the beilefit of such covenant. 
Held, the covenant was not violated and no nuisance committed or thr~atened. 
Frost_ v. The King Edward, etc. Assoc., (Ch. Div.), [1918] 2 Ch. 18o. 
The injunction was asked on the ground that "tuberculosis is an endemic 
and infectious disease. am;l the hospital is a source of danger to the neighbor-
hood." After hearing testimony of eminent authorities whose conclusions 
were aU- to the effect that the hospital was not a source of danger to the 
neighborhood and that there was no risk of infection from it to those living 
in its immediate vicinity, the court concluded as above stated. The fears of 
those in the neighborhood were found to be groundless. In Stotler v. Roch-
elle, 83 Kans: 86, an injunction against the establishment of a cancer hospital 
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in a residence district was upheld. The court said: "The question is not 
whether the establishment of the hospital would place the occupants of the 
adjacent dwellings in actual danger of infection, but whether they would 
have reasonable ground to fear such a result, and whether, in view of the 
general dread inspired by the disease, the reasonable enjoyment of their 
property would not be naturally interfered with by the bringing together of 
a considerable number of cancer patients in this place." To the same general 
effect are Baltimore v. Fairfield Imp. Co., 87 :Md. 352, where the placing of a 
l«;per for care and restraint in a residence neighborhood .was enjoined; 
Everett. v. Paschall, 6I Wash. 47, where it was held, partly, at least, under 
the influence of a statute, that the operation of a sanitarium for the treatment 
of pulmonary tuberculosis in a residence neighborhood was restrained, fear, 
very real though unfounded and unreasonable, on the part of the neighbors 
being considered sufficient to make out a case for relief. In .this connection 
the statement by LoRD HARDWICK£ in Anon., 3 Atk. 750, that "the fears of 
mankind, though they may be reasonable ones, will not create a nuisance," 
is interesting. Board of Health v. North American Home, 77 N. J. Eq. 464, 
very like the principal case in the character of disease treated, is in accord 
therewith. 
PUBLIC UTILITY RATES-OBLIGATION OF CONTRACT RULE AS AGAINST THE 
CoMPANY.-Webster in his dramatic appeal which suffused with tears the 
eyes of the great Chief Justice, and led to the decision in the Dartmo11tli 
College Case, 4 Wheat. 526, that a corporate charter is a contract, the obliga-
tion of which cannot be impairecl--without violating the constitution of the 
United States, saw only his beloved college, "one of the lesser lights in the 
literary horizon," which an adverse decision.might put out. It is safe to say 
that neither he nor the Chief Justice, nor anyone else present on that occasion 
saw in the sweep of that decision how relatively insignificant on that day 
were the interests of Dartmouth College, gr "all those great lights of science 
which for more than a century have thrown their radiance over our land." 
Actually that decision was of small moment to Dartmouth College, or to all 
the other educational institutions of the land. It was of tremendous im-
portance in other directions not dreamed of by the actors in that historic 
scene. It came into full vigor only when the decision of Mmm v. Illi11ois, 
94 U. S. II3, made way for' regulatory measures by states and municipalities 
over public utilities. As a result not a few of these have found themselves 
incumbered and embarrassed by contract rights and privileges freely and 
easily, and sometimes corruptly, granted to public service corporations by 
one generation, which the next would fain restrict or withdraw. Especially 
has this been the case with provisions as to the charges to be paid by the 
public for the service. 
These agreements were often between the utilities and municipal and other 
subordinate bodies politic. Recent decisions that rate making is a legislative 
function that might be lodged with a municipality, but only by specific terms 
showing such grant, have enabled municipalities to· escape restrictions they 
had assumed without this grant of power, and they have been glad to take 
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advantage of the way of escape from the burdensome agreements of their 
representatives. Milwaukee Electric Ry. Co. v. R.R. Com. of Wis., 238 U. S. 
174 So long as the rate revision was downward the public enjoyed the rule. 
But chidcens tend to come home to roost, and this rule allowing a legislature 
to override an agreement made by a municipality is doing it. The last two 
years has seen an unprecedent upward turn in the curve of prices and rates. 
Federal commissions are permitting increases of state-fixed rates, 16 MICH. 
L. Rr:v. 379, and stat_e commissions are raising municipality-fixed rates. This 
revision upward, in the face of charter agreements, is not so agreeable to the 
public. The Supreme Court in Englewood v. Denver and South Platte Ry. 
Co., U. S. Adv. 0., Jan. 7, 1919, page 149, upheld the decision of the Colorado 
Supreme Court "that this town, at least, deriving its powers from legislative 
grant, could make no contract of this sort that was not subject to control 
by the legislature; that the Public Utilities Commission had been authorized 
by the legislature to regulate the matter in controversy; that it had done so; 
and that this proceeding should be dismissed." The result is that many 
municipalities seem to be in a position where their charter contract with 
public utilities is valid against, but not for them. The war conditions may 
soon pass, but if not the bigger question is not far away, viz., the effect 
against the state itself of charter provision as to rates which do not yield a 
fair return, or any return, on the value of the property devoted to a public 
use. Whatever agreements may have been made, public utilities cannot be 
permanently operated at a loss. What will become of these charter-fixed 
rates? 
PU11Lic OFFICERs--R:r:cess :APPoINTMENT-LIMITATioN oN ExECunvii's 
PowER.-The governor of Pennsylvania forwarded to the state senate the 
name of Daniel F. Lafean for Col}firmation as commissioner of banking for 
the regular term. The senate rejected the nomination and shortly after the 
final adjournment of that body the governor appointed Lafean to fill the 
vacancy in the office and to serve until. the end of the next session of the 
senate. Lafean entered on the duties of his office, and the payment of the 
salary being refused him brought mandamus to compel the auditor general 
and state treasurer to approve and pay him the salary attached by law to the 
office. The- defendants appealed from the decision Qf the trial court award-
ing a peremptory writ and the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, with a court 
divided four to three, affirmed the decision. Commonwealth ex rel Lafean 
v. Snyder, (Pa., 1918), 104 Atl. 494. 
The constitution of Pennsylvania co.ntained the following common state 
constitutional provisions: The Governor "shall nominate, and, by and with 
the advice and consent of two-thirds of all the members of the Senate,.ap-
point * * * such * * * officers of the commonwealth as he is or 
may be authorized by the Constitution or law, to appoint; he shall have the 
power to fill all vacancies that may happen, in offices to which he may appoint, 
during the recess of the Senate, by granting commissions which shall expire 
at the end of their next session; * * * if the vacancy shall happen during 
the session of the Senate, the Governor shall nominate to the Senate, before 
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their final adjournment, a proper person to fill said vacancy." A majority of 
the court reasoned that the constitution expressly authorized the governor to 
fill vacancies happening during the recess of the senate and did not expressly 
place any restriction on his choice in making such a ·temporary appointment. 
They refused to find that any such restriction was to be implied from the 
constitution. The minority judges dissented on the ground that the constitu-
tion by implication prevented the governor from appointing to office, for any 
portion of the term thereof, a person whom tlie senate had rejected for ap-
pointment to the same office for the full term. The majority opinion men-
tions but does not discuss the point as to when the vacancy occurred. There 
is slight authority to the effect that where a vacancy occurs before the ad-
journment of the senate, it is not a vacancy happening during the recess of 
the senate or, in other words, the office does not become vacant during the 
recess. People \". Forquer (1825), l Ill. 104 Other courts have taken the 
opposite and better view and held that though the vacancy first occu; red 
during the session of the senate, it continues to exist or '"happen" until filled, 
and the power of recess appointment therefore embraces the power to fill 
temporarily a vacancy which existed when the senate was in session and for 
some reason was not filled. Jn re Farrow (186o)} 3 Fed. 112; State v. Kulil 
(1889), 51 N. J. L. 191. It is therefore entirely probable that had this point 
been decided by the court in the instant case it would have been settled that 
the vacancy "happened" during the recess of the senate and the governor's 
power of appointment would have been upheld. On the main point discussed 
by the court in the instant case the majority of the court appear to have been 
right. The governor's power to nominate and, by and with the advice and 
consent of the senate, to appoint a person to fill .an office for the full tenn is 
entirely separate and distinct from the governor's power of recess appoint-
ment. The mere fact that the two powers are conferred by the same section 
of the constitution furnished ho reason for limiting one by the other. Noth-
ing in the language of the section conferring these powers creates an implica-
tion that the governor's power of choice in making a recess appointment is 
limited by the senate's approval or disapproval of the person seleded. As 
shown in the majority opinion 'in the instant case, the implication contended 
for by the minority judges is so doubtful that it has been found necessary to 
insert in many state constitutions express provisions to secure the same effect 
sought to be obtained by the implication contended for in this case. The 
power of the executive to appoint to office, during the recess of the senate, 
to fill a vacancy and sen·e until· the end of the next session, a person who has 
been rejected for appointment to the same office for the regular term by the 
senate before its adjournment has been the subject of much speculation. This 
seems to be the first case in which the point is squarely decided. 
SALES-RIGHT TO RESCINO FOR BRE.\CH 01' \V ARR.\NTY.-Action to rescind 
the sale of an auto truck for breach of warranty. Held, Appellee by using 
the truck a year, though intermittently complaining of defects, had waived his 
right to rescind. lllternatio11al Haroester Co. of America \". Brown (Ky. 
1918), 2o6 s. w. 622. 
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In deciding that appellee had waived his right to rescind, the court neces-
sarily assumes the right to have existed subsequent to the sale. By the weight 
of authority in this country and England, the rule on the right of a purchaser 
to rescind a sale on breach of warranty is as stated in Thornton v. Wynn, 12 
Wheat. 184 and Street v. Blay, 2 B. & A. 456, wherein it was held that no 
such right existed in cases where title had passed to the vendee unless there 
had been fraud, or unless the right was given by breach of a condition subse-
quent. See 16 HARV. L. REY. 465, where the cases are collected and com-
mented on by Professor Williston. Opposed to this is the case of Bryant v. 
Ishberg, 13 Gray 007, where the court came to the conclusion that * * * 
"a warranty may be treated as a condition subsequent at the election of the 
vendee, who may, upon a breach thereof.rescind the contract and recover back 
the amount of his purchase money as in case of fraud." As to the status, 
strength and respective merit of the conflicting views in our courts, see a 
running discussion between Professors Williston and Burdick in 4 CoL. L. 
Rr:v. 2, 194, 265, wherein the former ably supports the Massachusetts rule and 
the latter strongly contends for the law of Street v. Blay. The instant case 
fails to state ex~iicitly the court's conception of the stand taken by the Ken-
tucigr courts on the question. Inferentially it holds to the right to ·rescind. 
In the case of Lightburn v. Cooper, ,l Dana (31 Ky.) 273, the court decided 
that "a simple warranty !ind tender even though there has been a breach of 
the warranty, cannot operate as a rescission." No subsequeqt cases have been 
~ound overruling this case. Cases cited by the court in the instant case, 
where the right to return the "goods was considered, contained provisions for 
rescission on breach of warranty. Dick v. Clark Jr. Electric Co., 161 Ky. 622; 
McCormick v. Arnold, n6 Ky. 5o8, or for replacement of any and all defective 
parts, Meek Coal Ge. v. Whitcomb Co., 164 Ky. 833; or, as in Yeiser et al. v. 
Russell & Cc., 26 Ky. L. Rep. n51, the breach went to a condition and was' 
waived by retention of the goods. Unless, therefore, there was some provision 
in the contract of sale for returning the goods on breach of warranty omitted 
from the report of the case under discussion, the court's assumption that such 
right existed in Kentucky, was fallacious. Under the rule of Lightburn v. 
Ccoper, the court would have arrived at the same conclusion on the ground 
that a mere breach of warranty and tender would not operate to revest the 
title in the seller, or if the matter be considered -as breach of a condition, the 
acceptance and use beyond the time necessary for inspection would be deemed 
a waiver of the right to rescind and the vendee would be put to his action for 
damages for breach of warranty. 
TRADE-MARKS-IND:EPENDEN't Oa1G1NATORS.-Complainant had built up, in 
Massachusetts and to a certain extent throughout the Union, a business which 
used the trade-mark "Rex" for medical· preparations. Defendant, unaware 
of this, used the same word as a trade-mark for similar goods and had built 
up a local business in Kentucky. Complainant sued to restrain defendant from 
further use of the_ trade-nia~k ;'Re:it" on the ground that it was an infringe-
ment Held, the decree of the District Court should be reversed and an in-
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junction denied. United Drug Co. v. Theodore Rectanus Co., (Dec. 1918) 
39 Sup. Ct. Rep. 48. 
It was settled that,complainant had been the first to use "Rex" as a trade-
mark, but that defendant adopted it in ignorance of complainant's use. The 
patentee of an invention can restrain others from using his invention regard-
less of his own use or neglect to use. Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern 
etc. Co., 210 U. S. 405. The fact that the infringer of a patent monopoly be-
lieved himself to be the originator of the idea (U.S. v. Berdam Co., 156 U. S. 
552, 566) or that he did not know the idea was patented, is immaterial. Royer 
v. Coupe, 29 Fed. 358. Cemplainant contended that the first originator of a 
'trade-mark is entitled to its exclusive use wherever his business comes into 
competition with others, citing Columbia .Mill Co. v. Alcorn, 150 U. S. 46o, 
et al. The gist of the decision in the principal case was, that adoption of a 
trade-mark secures no monopoly whatever, but merely creates a right in 
respect to a business; that where there is no business there is no right; and 
th4t defendant, having first built up the business to which the right apper-
tained in the particular locality, had the prior right in that locality. It seems 
settled that there must be an actual use of the trade-mark to give any right 
to it. HOPKINS ON TRADE-MARKS, sec. 29. That territorial rights, as between 
originating claimants, depend on actual territorial use is supported by Hano'l!cr 
Milling Co. v. Metca.lf, 240 U. S. 403, 4I5; Gorham Mfg. Co. v. Weintraub, 
196 Fed. 957. 
V£NU£ OF ACTIONS-LOCAL ACTIONS AGAINST MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS.-
Two counties, King and Pierce, undertook the improvement of a river, and by 
reason of their atleged negligence the property of a riparian owner in Pierce 
county was inju~ed. The owner sued both counties in the court- of Pierce 
county. Held, on objection by King county, that the action was brought in 
the proper place. State ex rel v. Superior Court (Wash. I9I8), I76 Pac. 
Rep. 352. 
The question was one of precedence between two rules, (r) that a munici-
pal corporation must be sued in its own courts, and (2) that a local action 
must be brought where the -wrongful act takes place. Here King .county was 
being sued in Pierce county for a trespass to real {>r~perty which occurred in 
the county of venue. The court held that a general rule of venue should be 
deemed to apply to municipal corporations as well as individuals unless they 
were expressly excepted. The statute fixing the venue for trespass to real 
property did not except counties, hence they were like individuals subject to 
suit where the injury took place. 
This is the general rule. In McBane v. People, 50 Ill. 5o6, a general statute 
on change of venue was held to authorize carrying an action out of the 
defendant county, notwithstanding that by the terms of a special statute it 
could have been commenced only in the defendant's courts. In Clarke v. 
Lyons County, 8 Nev. 18I, a general statute authorizing trial in a wrong 
venue where timely objections were not taken, was held to apply to counties. 
In Baltimore City v. Turnpike Cpmpany, 104 Md. 351, an action for trespass 
committed-by a city upon land outside the city was held properly brought in 
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the jurisdiction where the land was located. The rule exemplified in these 
cases offers an inferesting illustration of the strength of the local venue tradi-
tion of the common law,-a tradition which Lord Mansfield unsuccessfully 
tried to revise upon the principle that only proceedings in rem were essentially 
local. Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 1 Cowp. 161 ; Erskine's argument in Dou/son v. 
Matthews, 4 T. R. 503. An action against a county of one State brought in 
the courts of another State, where the process of attachment is available 
would seem to present no difficulty. Van Ham v. Kittitas County, 28 Misc. 
(N. Y.) 333, affirmed, 46 N. Y. App. Div. 623. 
W1LLS-EX£CUTORY D£VIS£-R£PUGNANCY-FAILUR£ OF PMCE:DING lNT£R-
£ST.-Testatrix by will gave her freeholds absolutely to A. "subject to the 
following bequests. * * * Secondly I desire that after my executor's 
(A's) death whatever of my freehold properties shall remain shall be given 
to" a named charity. Held, that if A had survived the testatrix the gift to 
the charity would have been repugnant and void and that A would have taken 
absolutely, but that, A having died in the lifetime of the testatrix, the doctrine 
of repugnancy did not apply, and the gift to the charity was accelerated and 
took effect.. In re Dunstan. Dunstan v. Dunstan, [1918] 2 Ch. 304-
Where property is given by will to a,_ devisee absolutely, any further dis-
position of such property is generally ineffective. A provision that if the 
first taker does not give· the property away in his life-time or dispose of it 
by will, it shall not go to his heir-at-law or personal representative is re-
pugnant and void; for what is once vested absolutely in a man cannot be 
taken from him out of the course of devolution at his death by any expression 
or wish on the part of the testator. It may happen, however, that the 
original gift never takes effect,-e. g., through the death of the devisee or 
legatee in the lifetime of the testator. The older cases made no exception in 
this situation. In 1855 Sir John Romilly, M. R., held that an executory be-
quest over in defeasance of a previous absolute bequest of personalty failed 
although the first legatee predeceased the testator. Hughes v. Ellis, 20 Beav. 
193. The same view had been taken in Andrew v. Andrew, (1845) 1 Coll. 
686 (consumable articles), and Harris v. Davis (1844) 1 Coll. 416, 9 Jur. 
269; Hughes v. Ellis was followed in Created v. Created (1859) 26 Beav. 
621. These cases were deservedly criticised by James, L. J., in In re Stringer's 
Estate (1877) 6 Ch. Div. 1, 14-15. As Justice James said, it is difficult to 
see why this principle should apply to a case "where the original gift never 
did take effect at all, because there is no repugnance. There may be re-
pugnance between the gift over and the gift intended to be made, but I 
am not quite sure that that ought to be applied to a case, supposing the 
point arose, where there was simply the death of the person creating a 
lapse." So far as bequests of personalty are concerned, the modern doctrine 
was established in In re Lowman [1895] 2 Ch. 348. Lindley, L. J., said: 
" * * * _where there are successive limitations of personal estate in 
favour of several persons absolutely, the first of them who survives the 
testator takes absolutely, although he would have taken nothing if any other 
legatee had survived and taken ; or in other words, in the case supposed 
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lhe effect of the failure of an earlier gift is to accelerate, and not destroy, 
the later gift. * * * The doctrine of repugnancy has no application to 
gifts that fail; the doctrine does not come into operation until somebody 
takes, and it is only those limitations which defeat the interest some one 
takes that are :void, on the ground that they are inconsistent with what is 
given to him." Lindley, L. J., expressly limited his decision to personal 
estate. The question therefore remained whether the same principle would 
apply to devises of land. The dictum of James, L. J., applied alike to land 
realty and personalty and Mr. Sweet expressed the opinion that when the 
point arose with regard to realty the courts would hold it subject to the same 
rule. I ]ARMAN, WILLS (ed. 6) 452. This problem seems to have been 
presented for the first time in -the principal case. Neville, J., held that no 
sound distinction could be drawn between real and personal estate and did 
not hesitate to extend the doctrine of In re Lowman to real estate. The 
passing of another futile distinction is pleasant to record. 
